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Abstract. Data describing historical growth of income per capita [Gross Domestic Product 
per capita (GDP/cap)] for the world economic growth and for the growth in Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, former USSR, Africa and Latin America are analysed. They 
follow closely the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions represented by the ratios of 
hyperbolic distributions obtained by fitting the GDP and population data. Results of this 
analysis demonstrate that income per capita was increasing monotonically. There was no 
stagnation and there were no transitions from stagnation to growth. The usually postulated 
dramatic escapes from the Malthusian trap never happened because there was no trap. 
Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally incorrect because its central postulates are 
contradicted repeatedly by data, which were used but never analysed during the formulation 
of this theory. The large body of readily-available data opens new avenues for the economic 
and demographic research. They show that certain fundamental postulates revolving around 
the concept of Malthusian stagnation need to be replaced by the evidence-based 
interpretations. Within the range of analysable data, which for the growth of population 
extends down to 10,000 BC, growth of human population and economic growth were 
hyperbolic. There was no Malthusian stagnation and there were no transitions to distinctly 
faster trajectories. Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing growth trajectories.  
 
 
Introduction  
The aim of this publication is to present the direct proof that contrary to the 
fundamental postulate of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) 
distributions describing historical growth of income per capita cannot be divided 
into three, distinctly-different regimes of growth governed by distinctly different 
mechanisms. The indirect proof was presented earlier (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016c, 
2016e) by showing that the historical growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and of human population were hyperbolic  and that postulated by Galor three 
regimes of growth did not exist. Mathematical analysis of the latest data 
(Maddison, 2001, 2010) brings a new insight into the interpretation of the historical 
economic growth. Within the range of analysable data there was no Malthusian 
stagnation, no alleged takeoffs from stagnation to growth and no escapes from the 
hypothetical Malthusian trap because there was no trap.  
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Unified Growth Theory serves as a good example of traditional interpretations of 
economic growth revolving around the concept of Malthusian stagnation. It is also 
a theory, which appears to be based on Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001) but is 
not. Ironically, even though these excellent data were used during the formulation 
of this theory, they were never mathematically analysed. Unified Growth Theory is 
not based on the scientific analysis of data but on impressions supported by the 
habitually distorted presentation of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 
2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor and Moav, 2002; 
Snowdon & Galor, 2008). Data were either used unprofessionally or they were 
manipulated to support preconceived ideas.  
Historical economic growth and historical growth of human population were 
hyperbolic (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). Hyperbolic distributions are confusing and 
they are often misinterpreted in studies of economic growth and of the growth of 
human population. They present an image of a slow growth over a long time 
followed by a fast growth over a short time. These distributions are, therefore 
usually divided into two distinctly-different segments, slow and fast. The selected 
slow segment is then claimed to represent the epoch of Malthusian stagnation while 
the selected fast segment is assumed to represent an entirely new type of growth. 
The alleged transition between these two arbitrarily-selected segments is then 
described as explosion, takeoff, sudden spurt, sprint or the dramatic escape from 
the Malthusian trap. Distinctly-different mechanisms are also assigned for the two 
perceived segments of growth.  
Often, however, interpretations of historical growth are not even based on any 
attempt to examine rigorously relevant data. Isolated examples are used to support 
the concept of stagnation followed by explosion. Even worse, more often than not, 
interpretations and explanations are just based on impressions and suppositions. 
Claims of the existence of Malthusian stagnation and transitions to different stages 
of growth are supported by a good dose of creative imagination.  
There is no mathematically justifiable reason for dividing hyperbolic distributions 
into two or three distinctly-different components (Nielsen, 2014). It is 
mathematically impossible to divide hyperbolic distributions into slow and fast 
components. Hyperbolic distributions are slow over a long time and fast over a 
short time but they increase monotonically. Growth rate also increases 
monotonically without any unusual acceleration at any time. It increases 
hyperbolically with time or linearly with the size growing entity (Nielsen, 2016f). 
Concepts of stagnation and takeoffs from stagnation to growth are scientifically 
unjustifiable. They are contradicted by the analysis of data describing economic 
growth and the growth of population.    
Hyperbolic distributions have to be interpreted as a whole and the same mechanism 
has to be used for the apparent slow and for the apparent fast segments. These 
segments do not exist even though they appear to exist. The best way to 
demonstrate that these segments do not exist is by using reciprocal values of 
hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2014). 
Historical economic growth is even more confusing than the historical growth of 
human population because economic growth is often described using income per 
capita represented by the Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP/cap). It is a 
ratio of hyperbolic distributions and it creates an even stronger illusion of different 
stages of growth than the illusion created by hyperbolic distributions. It has been 
demonstrated (Nielsen, 2015) that the characteristic features of the GDP/cap 
distributions, which are interpreted as the epoch of stagnation followed by a sudden 
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takeoff, are nothing more than mathematical properties of dividing two hyperbolic 
distributions. It is incorrect to claim that these features characterise uniquely 
economic growth.  
The ratio of two hyperbolic distributions, which includes the GDP/cap ratio, 
increases monotonically and there is no mathematically-justifiable reason for 
dividing them into distinctly different regimes of growth. There is no mathematical 
justification for assigning different mechanisms of growth to the two perceived but 
non-existing segments of income per capita distributions.  
Growth of income per capita was slow over a long time and fast over a short time 
but it was increasing monotonically. The ratio of monotonically-increasing 
hyperbolic distributions can only produce a monotonically-changing distribution, 
increasing or decreasing, depending on the singularities of hyperbolic distributions 
(Nielsen, 2015). Such a ratio cannot produce a distribution with a sudden 
discontinuity, which could be described as a takeoff.  
The growth of income per capita has to be explained by using the same mechanism 
for the whole distribution, slow and fast. We shall now demonstrate that the 
empirical distributions describing income per capita were indeed increasing 
monotonically and that there were no sudden takeoffs from stagnation to growth as 
claimed incorrectly in the Unified Growth Theory (2005a, 2011).      
 
Unified Growth Theory 
Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010) offer an unprecedented opportunity to 
test the past and present explanations of economic growth and of the growth of 
human population, explanations based on strongly-limited sources of empirical 
information and on creative imagination. Now, the rich body of data brings new 
and refreshing insights into the interpretation of the historical economic growth and 
of the growth of population. It is both unfortunate and ironic that Galor had access 
to these data but failed to use them to make important discoveries. He repeatedly 
distorted empirical distributions to support his preconceived ideas. An example of 
such distorted and self-misleading presentations of data is shown in Figure 1. 
However now, the same data, when properly analysed, demonstrate that the 
Unified Growth Theory and other similar interpretations of economic growth or the 
growth of population are repeatedly contradicted by empirical evidence (Nielsen, 
2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f). 
Hyperbolic distributions do not have to be distorted to be confusing. They are 
already sufficiently confusing and it is easy to make mistakes with their 
interpretations. Distorted presentations, such as repeatedly used by Galor, make the 
interpretation of these distributions even more difficult. The example presented in 
Figure 1 is based on a figure presented by Galor (2005a, p. 181). Such self-
misleading presentations of data can be expected to lead inevitably to incorrect 
conclusions. It is hard to understand why such distorted diagrams were repeatedly 
used by Galor because the analysis of hyperbolic distributions is trivially simple 
(Nielsen, 2014). 
The fundamental postulates of the Unified Growth Theory are based on the 
assumption of the existence of three, distinctly-different regimes of economic 
growth: Malthusian regime of stagnation, post-Malthusian regime and the 
sustained-growth regime. According to Galor (2005a, 2008a, 2011, 2012a), 
Malthusian regime of stagnation was between 100,000 BC and AD 1750 for 
developed regions and between 100,000 BC and AD 1900 for less-developed 
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regions. The post-Malthusian regime was allegedly between AD 1750 and 1850 for 
developed regions and from 1900 for less-developed regions. The sustained-growth 
regime was supposed to have commenced around 1850 for developed regions. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of the ubiquitous, grossly-distorted and self-misleading diagrams used 
to create the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011). Maddison’s data (Maddison, 
2001) were used during the formulation of this theory but they were never analysed. Such 
state-of-the-art was used to construct a system of scientifically-unsupported interpretations, 
explanations and “mysteries of the growth process” (Galor, 2005a, p. 220).   
 
The end of the regime of Malthusian stagnation was supposed to have been 
characterised by dramatic takeoffs from stagnation to growth, described as a 
“remarkable” or “stunning” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 
177, 220). It is a signature, which cannot be missed. This change in the pattern of 
growth is described as “the sudden take-off from stagnation to growth” (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220, 277; italics added) or as a “sudden spurt” (Galor, 2005a, 177, 
220). According to Galor, the end of the Malthusian regime of stagnation for 
developed regions coincides with the Industrial Revolution. “The take-off of 
developed regions from the Malthusian Regime was associated with the Industrial 
Revolution” (Galor, 2005a, p. 185). Indeed, the Industrial Revolution is considered 
to have been “the prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212). 
For developed regions, the postulated sudden takeoffs from stagnation to growth 
should have occurred around AD 1750, or around the time of the Industrial 
Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 1994). For less-developed regions, 
they should have occurred around 1900. A transition from growth to growth is not 
a signature of the postulated sudden takeoff from stagnation to growth. Thus, for 
instance, a transition from hyperbolic growth to another hyperbolic growth or to 
some other steadily-increasing trajectory is not a signature of the sudden takeoff 
from stagnation to growth. Likewise, a transition at a distinctly different time is not 
a confirmation of the theoretical expectations.  
In the diagrams presented below, income per capita (GDP/cap) is in 1990 
International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
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Hyperbolic growth 
It has been shown earlier that over the range of analysable data historical growth of 
population and historical economic growth were hyperbolic (Nielsen, 2014, 2015, 
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f). For the economic growth, the range of 
analysable data extends down to AD 1 but for the growth of the world population it 
extends to 10,000 BC. These results are consistent with the analysis carried out 
over 50 years ago for the growth of the world population during the AD era (von 
Foerster, Mora, & Amiot, 1960) and with other similar studies (Kapitza, 2006; 
Kremer, 1993; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962, 2002; von Hoerner, 1975)   
Demographic and economic research has to be based on the acceptance of 
hyperbolic descriptions of the historical growth of population and of the historical 
economic growth. Hyperbolic growth, confirmed repeatedly and consistently by 
data (Biraben, 1980; Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Durand, 1967, 1974, 1977; Gallant, 
1990; Haub, 1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; Maddison, 2001, 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 
1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994) leaves no room 
for the outdated interpretations revolving around the concept of Malthusian 
stagnation followed by sudden takeoffs to a distinctly faster growth. Mathematical 
analysis of data consistently and repeatedly contradicts these hypothetical but 
unsupported concepts, including the concept that the Industrial Revolution had a 
decisive influence on changing growth trajectories. It did not.     
Hyperbolic distribution describing growth is represented by a reciprocal of a linear 
function:  
    
1
( )S t
a kt
,                (1) 
where ( )S t  is the size of the hyperbolically growing entity (e.g. the GDP or the 
size of the population), while a and k are positive constants.  
Distribution describing the time-dependence of income per capita (GDP/cap) is the 
ratio of two hyperbolic distributions: the hyperbolic distribution describing the 
growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a) and the hyperbolic distribution describing the 
growth of population (Nielsen, 2016d). A GDP/cap distribution can be also 
interpreted as a ratio of two linearly decreasing distributions describing the 
respective reciprocal values or as a product of a hyperbolic distribution 
representing the GDP and a linear function representing the reciprocal values of the 
size of the population. Consequently, the GDP/cap ratio can be simply described as 
the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution, where the linear modulation is done 
by the reciprocal values of the size of population (Nielsen, 2015). 
 
Growth of the world GDP/cap 
Results of mathematical analysis of the world GDP/cap are presented in Figure 2. 
The fitted distribution represents the linearly-modulated GDP distribution (Nielsen, 
2015). Parameters describing the GDP data 2
1 1.684 10a and 
6
1 8.539 10k while the parameters describing the world population data are  
0
2 7.73 19 0a and 
3
2 3.76 15 0k .  
For the growth of the world GDP/cap we should see the signature of two takeoffs: 
around AD 1750 for developed regions and around AD 1900 for less-developed 
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regions. Yet we see none of them. There was no stagnation before the Industrial 
Revolution and no transition from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 for 
developed regions or around AD 1900 for less-developed regions, as claimed by 
Galor (2008a, 2012a).  
The data show a minor disturbance around AD 1900 which looks like a minor 
boosting. However, it is definitely not a “remarkable” or “stunning” escape from 
the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) because (1) the growth deviated 
only slightly from the historical trajectory, (2) this minor deviation was not 
preceded by stagnation and (3) because it was only temporary disturbance and the 
growth soon returned to the original trajectory. Furthermore, rather than being 
permanently and spectacularly propelled along a distinctly new trajectory, as 
implied by Galor’s claims of “remarkable” and “stunning” takeoffs (Galor, 2005a, 
pp. 177, 220), economic growth as described by data, started to be diverted to a 
slower trajectory. There was definitely no transition from stagnation to growth. 
There was no dramatic escape from the Malthusian trap because there was no trap. 
 
 
Figure 2. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of the world income 
per capita (GDP/cap) are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution 
(Nielsen, 2015) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). 
The alleged takeoffs from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 for developed regions and 
around 1900 for less-developed regions, as claimed by Galor (2008a, 2012a), did not 
happen. Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the trajectory describing the 
growth of income per capita (GDP/cap). 
 
 
Western Europe 
Growth of the GDP/cap in Western Europe is shown in Figure 3. Maddison’s data 
(Maddison, 2010) are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distribution obtained by dividing two hyperbolic distributions: the distribution 
describing the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a) and the distribution describing 
the growth of the population (Nielsen, 2016d). Parameters describing the displayed 
curve are:  2
1 9.859 10a and 
5
1 5.112 10k for the GDP and  
1
2 7.54 12 0a and 
2
2 3.74 19 0k for the growth of the population. 
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Figure 3. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in Western Europe are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distribution (Nielsen, 2015) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 
2016a, 2016d). The alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 (Galor, 
2008a, 2012a) did not happen. Industrial Revolution had no impact on the trajectory 
describing the growth of income per capita (GDP/cap). The analysis of data used by Galor 
shows that “the prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212) had absolutely 
no impact on changing the economic growth trajectory in the region where this “engine” 
should have been most effective and where its impacts should have been most pronounced. 
From around AD 1900, the growth of the GDP/cap started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. 
 
Results presented in Figure 3 are particularly important because they show that 
contrary to the generally accepted interpretations, Industrial Revolution had 
absolutely no impact on changing the growth trajectory of income per capita in the 
region where its impact should have been most pronounced. Galor’s claim that the 
Industrial Revolution was “the prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, 
p. 212) is remarkably contradicted by the same data, which he used during the 
formulation of his theory. This and other examples show how important 
Maddison’s data are in correcting the outdated interpretations of the historical 
economic growth.  
It has been shown earlier (Nielsen, 2016a) that economic growth was hyperbolic 
not only for the total of 30 countries of Western Europe but also for the four 
countries, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, described by the most 
complete sets of data and representing the most advanced economies. For these 
countries, hyperbolic growth was between AD 1 and 1875 when it started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory. There was no Malthusian stagnation, no takeoff and 
no escape from the Malthusian trap, because there was no trap. Industrial 
Revolution had absolutely no impact on changing economic growth trajectory in 
these four progressive countries where the impact of this revolution should be 
clearly demonstrated in the economic growth data.   
Analysis of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) demonstrates that the “remarkable” 
or “stunning” escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) never 
happened because there was no trap. Whether expressed in terms of the GDP or 
GDP/cap, economic growth was remarkably undisturbed during the time of the 
Industrial Revolution and continued undisturbed until around 1900, when it started 
to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
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Eastern Europe 
Results of analysis of the growth of income per capita in Eastern Europe are 
summarized in Figure 4. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) are compared with the 
linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution obtained by dividing two hyperbolic 
distributions: the distribution describing the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a) 
and the distribution describing the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016d). 
Parameters describing the fitted GDP/cap distribution are:  1
1 7.749 10a and 
4
1 4.048 10k for the GDP and  
2
2 3.05 15 0a and 
1
2 1.52 15 0k for the 
growth of the population. 
 
Figure 4. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in Eastern Europe are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distribution (Nielsen, 2015) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 
2016a, 2016d). The alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 (Galor, 
2008a, 2012a) did not happen. Industrial Revolution had no impact on the trajectory 
describing the growth of income per capita (GDP/cap). From around AD 1850, rather than 
being boosted by the Industrial Revolution, the growth of the GDP/cap started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory. 
 
Growth of income per capita was slow but it was not stagnant. It was following the 
linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. Industrial Revolution had absolutely no 
impact on shaping the growth trajectory. The “stunning” takeoff postulated by 
Galor did not happen. His theory is repeatedly and consistently contradicted by the 
data he used during the formulation of his theory. Rather than being boosted by the 
Industrial Revolution, the growth of the GDP/cap started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory from as early as around AD 1850. 
 
Former USSR 
Results of analysis of the growth of income per capita in the former USSR are 
summarized in Figure 5. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) are compared with the 
linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution obtained by dividing two hyperbolic 
distributions: the distribution describing the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a) 
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and the distribution describing the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016d). 
Parameters describing the fitted GDP/cap distribution are:  1
1 6.547 10a and 
4
1 3.452 10k for the GDP and  
2
2 2.61 18 0a and 
1
2 1.33 13 0k for the 
growth of the population. 
 
Figure 5. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in the former USSR are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distribution (Nielsen, 2015) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 
2016a, 2016d). The alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth around AD 1750 (Galor, 
2008a, 2012a) did not happen. Industrial Revolution had no impact on the trajectory 
describing the growth of income per capita (GDP/cap). From around AD 1870, rather than 
being boosted by the Industrial Revolution, the growth of the GDP/cap started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory. 
 
Growth of income per capita in the countries of the former USSR was following 
closely the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution from AD 1. The growth was 
slow but not stagnant. Growth of the GDP and population were monotonic 
(Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d) and consequently the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) was also monotonic. The “remarkable” or “stunning” takeoff (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220) claimed by Galor never happened. This wished-for feature is 
repeatedly contradicted by the analysis of economic and population data (Nielsen, 
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f) and by the analysis of the GDP/cap 
distributions. Soon after the alleged, but non-existent sudden takeoff from the non-
existent stagnation to growth, the growth of income per capita in the countries of 
the former USSR started to be diverted to a new and slower trajectory. 
 
Asia 
Analysis of the growth of income per capita (GDP/cap) in Asia (including Japan) is 
summarised in Figure 6. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) are compared with the 
linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution obtained by dividing two hyperbolic 
distributions: the distribution describing the growth of the GDP (Nielsen, 2016a) 
and the distribution describing the growth of the population (Nielsen, 2016d). 
Parameters describing the fitted GDP/cap distribution are:  2
1 2.303 10a and 
5
1 1.129 10k for the GDP and 
1
2 1.06 18 0a and 
3
2 4.99 19 0k for the 
growth of population. 
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Figure 6. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in Asia are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution 
(Nielsen, 2015) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). 
The boosting, which commenced around AD 1950 follows closely the original historical 
trajectory and is likely to cross it and move to the other side. This temporary disturbance is 
a part of the commonly-observed recent transitions to slower trajectories. The only 
difference in this case is that the transition to a slower trajectory was preceded by a minor 
boosting.     
 
Growth of the GDP/cap was slow over a long time, which is hardly surprising 
because the initial slow growth is the mathematically-characteristic feature of the 
GDP/cap distributions (Nielsen, 2015). The growth was following closely the 
linearly-modulated hyperbolic trajectory determined by dividing the hyperbolic 
distribution fitting the GDP data (Nielsen, 2016a) by the hyperbolic distribution 
fitting the population data (Nielsen, 2016d).  
Asia is made primarily of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) so 
the alleged “stunning” takeoff from the alleged stagnation to growth should have 
occurred around AD 1900 (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). The data show a certain degree 
of boosting shortly after the time of the claimed “stunning” takeoff from stagnation 
to growth. However, this boosting is not a transition from stagnation to growth 
because the preceding trajectory was not stagnant and because the boosted 
trajectory follows closely the historical trend. It was obviously only a temporary 
boosting because the boosted trajectory is progressively coming closer to the 
historical trajectory and judging by its decreasing gradient it is likely to move to 
the other side. 
This boosting could be probably explained by Japan’s contribution to the total 
GDP/cap. Until 1900, Japan’s contribution was less than 5% but by 1950 it 
gradually increased to 12% and by 2000 it climbed to 20%. Japan belongs to the 
more-developed countries so according to Galor (2008a, 2012a) it should have 
experienced “remarkable” and “stunning” takeoff (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220) in 
its GDP/cap around 1750 but it did not. On the other hand, Asia should have 
experienced a sudden explosion in the GDP/cap growth around 1900 but it did not. 
There was no dramatic transition from stagnation to growth as claimed by Galor 
but only a transition from the non-stagnant, linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
11 
 
trajectory to a temporarily faster growth, which appears to have been caused 
primarily, if not entirely, by the increasing contribution of Japan’s economy, the 
contribution, which should have commenced explosively around 1750 but it did 
not. Impressions prompted by wished-for features and reinforced by distorted 
presentations of data such as shown in Figure 1 could be persuasive but they can be 
also strongly misleading. Data have to be rigorously analysed. 
 
Africa 
Results of analysis of the growth of income per capita in Africa are presented in 
Figure 7. As demonstrated earlier (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d), the GDP and 
population data for Africa can be fitted using two hyperbolic distributions, a slow 
distribution followed by a fast distribution. The transition from the slow to fast 
distribution occurred around 1820 for the growth of the GDP and around 1840 for 
the growth of population. 
 
 
Figure 7. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in Africa are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions 
(Nielsen, 2015) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). 
The alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth around AD 1900 for less-developed regions 
(Galor, 2008a, 2012a) did not happen because the GDP/cap trajectory was not stagnant 
before that year and because it continued undisturbed after this year until around 1950 
when it started to be diverted to a slower trajectory.      
 
Parameters describing the fitted GDP/cap distribution between AD 1 and 1820 are:  
1
1 1.244 10a and 
5
1 5.030 10k for the GDP and  
1
2 5.79 14 0a and 
2
2 2.47 13 0k for the growth of the population. For the GDP/cap distribution 
from AD 1840, parameters are:  1
1 4.192 10a and 
4
1 2.126 10k for the 
GDP and  2
2 1.57 11 0a and 
2
2 7.83 14 0k . The fit to the transient region 
between AD 1820 and 1840 was obtained by polynomial interpolation.  
Africa presents an interesting and unique case when the singularity for the 
hyperbolic trajectory describing the growth of population between AD 1 and 1840 
is earlier than the singularity for the hyperbolic trajectory describing the growth of 
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the GDP between AD 1 and 1820. For the growth of the population, the point of 
singularity is at  2343t  while for the growth of the GDP it is at 2473t   
(Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d).  
For the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution the escape to infinity at a fixed 
time occurs when the singularity for the growth of the GDP is earlier than the 
singularity for the growth of population (Nielsen, 2015). If the singularity for the 
growth of population occurs earlier, as in Africa, then the GDP/cap ratio decreases 
slowly with time and then escapes rapidly to zero at the time of the singularity for 
the growth of population. The decreasing GDP/cap distribution between AD 1 and 
the early 1800s in Africa does not represent an unusual and distinctly different 
mechanism of economic growth but simply the mathematical property of dividing 
two hyperbolic distributions describing the growth of the GDP and population. In 
particular, it does not represent Malthusian stagnation because both the GDP and 
the population were increasing hyperbolically (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). 
Africa is also made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) so 
according to Galor (2008a, 2012a) it should have experienced stagnation until 
around AD 1900 followed by a clear takeoff around that year. These expectations 
are contradicted by data.   
In contradiction of Galor’s interpretations of economic growth (Galor, 2005a, 
2008a, 2011, 2012a), the Malthusian regime of stagnation did not exist. The GDP 
and population were increasing hyperbolically during the entire time of the alleged 
but non-existent regime of Malthusian stagnation, from AD 1 to 1900 and even 
after that year. Unrecognised by Galor (because he did not analyse data but 
preferred to use distorted diagrams) there was a transition between two hyperbolic 
trajectories during his assumed but non-existent regime of Malthusian stagnation 
reflected in the transition from a slowly decreasing to a fast increasing linearly-
modulated hyperbolic trajectory.  
Africa is the only region where the economic growth was boosted at the time of the 
Industrial Revolution but it is also the poorest region, where the claimed 
Malthusian stagnation should have been most clearly demonstrated. According to 
Galor, Malthusian stagnation should have prevailed in Africa until around 1900 
(Galor, 2008a, 2012a). This hypothesis, which appears to have been confirmed by 
his manipulation of data, is clearly and convincingly contradicted by their 
mathematical analysis.   
Analysis of data describing the GDP and population in Africa shows that there was 
no stagnation over the entire range of the AD era (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). 
Economic growth (as described by the GDP) and the growth of population were 
following the steadily-increasing and undisturbed hyperbolic trajectories but 
around the time of the Industrial Revolution they were diverted to faster hyperbolic 
trajectories. There are no signs of Malthusian stagnation before and after the 
Industrial Revolution and before AD 1900, which was supposed to mark the end of 
the epoch of Malthusian stagnation. Hyperbolic growth, even if slow, does not 
represent Malthusian stagnation. Convincing signature of Malthusian stagnation is 
random fluctuations often described as Malthusian oscillations. This signature is 
missing in the data but the data show steadily-increasing hyperbolic distributions 
describing economic growth and the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). 
Analysis of the GDP/cap data shows that after a transition from a slowly-
decreasing trajectory before around 1840 (which as we have pointed out does not 
represent Malthusian stagnation but the mathematical properties of dividing 
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monotonically-increasing hyperbolic trajectories) the growth of the GDP/cap in 
Africa was following a vigorously-increasing trajectory during the alleged 
Malthusian stagnation. So while the suitable manipulation of data (Galor, 2005a, 
2011) appears to be confirming preconceived ideas, mathematical analysis of 
precisely the same data shows that the preconceived ideas are clearly incorrect.  
This analysis also shows that difficult and primitive living conditions should not be 
immediately interpreted as Malthusians stagnation. Living conditions in the past 
may have been primitive and difficult by modern standards but they should not be 
used as a proof of the existence of Malthusian stagnation. They certainly did not 
interfere with the economic growth and with the growth of human population 
(2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f).  
Data and their analyses show no impact and no presence of the hypothetical 
Malthusian stagnation. While the time-range of the data describing economic 
growth is relatively short, because it extends only down to AD 1, the time-range of 
the population data is significantly longer: it extends down to 10,000 BC. 
Mathematical analysis of data finds no confirmation of the existence of the 
hypothetical epoch of Malthusian stagnation. It is a vague concept, which has no 
application to the explanation of the dynamics of economic and demographic 
growth. Its continuing presence in academic discussions as a tool to explain the 
dynamics of growth appears to be not only totally irrelevant but also harmful 
because it diverts attention form finding correct explanations of the growth process. 
It is also useful to compare results of the analysis for Africa with the results for 
Western Europe. Industrial Revolution, “the prime engine of economic growth” 
(Galor, 2005a, p. 212) should have worked most efficiently in Western Europe and 
its effects should have been most convincingly confirmed by data, but these effects 
are convincingly contradicted by data: the alleged engine did not change the 
economic growth trajectory in Western Europe. Likewise, Malthusian stagnation 
should have been most prominently confirmed in Africa but is not. There was 
never any form of stagnation in the economic growth in Africa.  
Furthermore, while in Western Europe, Industrial Revolution had absolutely no 
impact on changing the economic growth trajectory, in Africa there was a 
spectacular acceleration of growth during the time of the Industrial Revolution but 
it was not the acceleration from stagnation to growth but from growth to growth. 
The wished-for features are contradicted by data showing that even plausible 
stories and explanations should not be accepted in science unless they can be 
confirmed by relevant data; otherwise they are just stories of fiction.   
The alleged sudden acceleration (takeoff) in income per capita is supposed to have 
been associated with the benefits of progress such as better health care, better 
housing, better education, higher standard of living and generally better living 
conditions. However, data show that in Europe there was no takeoff in the income 
per capita at the time of the Industrial Revolution, while in Africa there was a 
dramatic acceleration without a dramatic improvement in the style of living. On the 
contrary, this dramatic boosting in income per capita at the time of the Industrial 
Revolution appears to coincide with the dramatic deterioration of living conditions 
of native populations. It occurred around the time of the intensified colonisation of 
Africa (Duignan & Gunn, 1973; McKay, Hill, Buckler, Ebrey, Beck, Crowston, & 
Wiesner-Hanks, 2012; Pakenham, 1992).  
If a sudden takeoff is supposed to mark the “remarkable” or “stunning” escape 
from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005a, pp. 177, 220), then the only such takeoff 
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occurred in Africa. However, this dramatic takeoff did not mark the transition from 
stagnation to growth, because there was no stagnation. It also did not mark the 
dramatic escape from the Malthusian trap because there was no Malthusian trap. 
(Economic growth and the growth of population were steadily increasing before 
this takeoff.) It marked the transition from freedom and independence to the trap of 
misery, deprivation and suffering of the native population of Africa. Story-writing 
is good in fiction but in science such creative activities should be moderated by the 
rigorous analysis of relevant data. 
 
Latin America 
Results of analysis of economic growth in Latin America are presented in Figure 8. 
Data for Latin America contain a discontinuity in the growth of the GDP and 
population between AD 1500 and 1600 (Nielsen, 2016a, 2016d). This discontinuity 
is reflected in the discontinuity of the growth of income per capita (GDP/cap).  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) describing the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in Latin America are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
distributions (Nielsen, 2015) obtained by fitting the GDP and population data (Nielsen, 
2016a, 2016d). There was a discontinuity in the economic growth and in the growth of 
population between AD 1500 and 1600 reflected in the discontinuity in the GDP/cap 
distribution. The alleged takeoff from stagnation to growth around AD 1900 (Galor, 2008a, 
2012a) did not happen because the GDP/cap trajectory was not stagnant before that year 
and because there was no sudden acceleration in growth. On the contrary, around the 
alleged takeoff the growth of income per capita started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. 
 
Parameters describing the slowly-increasing linearly-modulated hyperbolic 
trajectory are 1
1 4.421 10a and 
4
1 2.09 13 0k  for the GDP and 
2
2 1.765 10a and 
2
2 8.24 12 0k for the population. The fast-increasing 
trajectory from AD 1600 is described by the following parameters:  
0
1 1.57 10 0a and 
4
1 8.22 14 0k  for the GDP and 
2
2 6.56 11 0a and 
1
2 3.37 11 0k   for the population. The discontinuity in the economic growth 
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and in the growth of population coincides with the onset of Spanish conquest 
(Bethell, 1984). However, after this relatively brief delay, economic growth and the 
growth of human population were following fast-increasing hyperbolic trajectories.  
Latin America is also made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) 
so again, according to Galor (2008a, 2012a), the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) in this region should have been stagnant until around AD 1900 and fast 
from around that year. This pattern of growth is contradicted by data. The data 
show a diametrically different pattern: (1) there is no convincing evidence of the 
existence of stagnation over the entire range of time between AD 1 and 1900 
(convincing evidence of Malthusian stagnation requires the presence of random 
fluctuations) but there is a sufficiently convincing evidence of the linearly-
modulated hyperbolic growth particularly between AD 1600 and 1900; (2) there 
was no takeoff from stagnation to growth at any time; and (3) at the time of the 
postulated takeoff in 1900 the growth of income per capita started to be diverted to 
a slower trajectory. The wished-for takeoff is replaced by a slower growth. 
However, even if we had a takeoff around that time it would have been a takeoff of 
a different kind, not a takeoff from stagnation to growth as required by the Unified 
Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) but a takeoff from growth to growth. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
Results of mathematical analysis of the historical income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distributions are presented in Table 1. The listed parameters ( 1a , 1k , 2a , 2k ) describe 
the fitted, linearly-modulated hyperbolic trajectories (Nielsen, 2015) represented by 
the ratios of hyperbolic distributions describing the growth of the GDP and 
population. Parameters 1a and 1k describe hyperbolic distributions fitting the GDP 
data (Nielsen, 2016a), while parameters  2a and 2k describe hyperbolic distributions 
fitting population data (Nielsen, 2016d).  
 
Table 1. Summary of the mathematical analysis of the historical income per capita 
(GDP/cap) distributions 
Region 
1a  1k  2a  2k  
Stagna
tion 
Take
off 
World 21.684 10  68.539 10  07.739 10  33.765 10  
X X 
Western Europe 29.859 10  55.112 10  17.542 10  23.749 10  
X X 
Eastern Europe 17.749 10  44.048 10  23.055 10  11.525 10  
X X 
Former USSR 16.547 10  43.452 10  22.618 10  11.333 10  
X X 
Asia 22.303 10  51.129 10  11.068 10  34.999 10  
X X 
Africa 
 
11.244 10  
14.192 10  
55.030 10  
42.126 10  
15.794 10  
21.571 10  
22.473 10  
27.834 10  
X X 
Latin America 
 
14.421 10  
01.570 10  
42.093 10  
48.224 10  
21.765 10  
26.561 10  
28.242 10  
13.371 10  
X X 
Notes: 1a , 1k , 2a , 2k – Parameters describing linearly-modulated hyperbolic distributions (ratios of 
hyperbolic distributions). Parameters 1a , 1k describe hyperbolic growth of the GDP, while 2a , 2k
describe hyperbolic growth of population [see eqn (1)]. X – No stagnation/takeoff. Within the range 
of the mathematically-analysable data the claimed by Galor (2005A, 2008A, 2011, 2012A) 
Malthusian regime of stagnation did not exist. The claimed takeoffs from stagnation to growth 
never happened. 
Results of this analysis demonstrate explicitly that the postulated by Galor (2005a, 
2008a, 2011, 2012a) takeoffs in the income per capita (GDP/cap) did not happen. 
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There were no transitions from stagnation to growth because within the 
mathematically-analysable data Galor’s regime of Malthusian stagnation did not 
exist. Growth of income per capita was following the linearly-modulated 
hyperbolic distributions until recently when it started to be diverted to slower 
trajectories.  
Galor’s Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is contradicted yet again by 
data. The “remarkable” and “stunning’ escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 
2005a, pp. 177, 220) never happened because there was no trap. His claim of the 
existence of the differential takeoffs is also contradicted by data because we cannot 
have differential takeoffs without takeoffs. Galor describes phenomena that did not 
exist. His explanations of economic growth are based on phantom features created 
by hyperbolic illusions and magnified by his habitually distorted presentation of 
data such as illustrated in Figure 1. His theory is irrelevant and misleading. 
Galor had access to the excellent data of Maddison (2001). He even used them 
during the formulation of his theory but he did not attempt to analyse them, which 
is surprising because their analysis is trivially simple (Nielsen, 2014). Now, 
precisely the same data can be used to demonstrate that his Unified Growth Theory 
(Galor, 2005a, 2011) is repeatedly contradicted by data (Nielsen, 2014, 2015, 
2016a, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f).  
Unified Growth Theory is fundamentally incorrect and scientifically unacceptable. 
It is a theory based on scientifically unsupported concepts created by impressions 
and reinforced by the manipulation of data. Excellent data of Maddison (2001) 
were not analysed but presented repeatedly using distorted and misleading 
diagrams such as shown in Figure 1. Such distorted presentation of data appears 
not only ubiquitously in the Unified Growth Theory but also in other related 
publications (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 
2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor and Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 
2008).  Selected values of data were also repeatedly quoted to support the concept 
of stagnation followed by takeoffs from stagnation to growth. This is an 
unscientific approach to research but it is a method used often when defending 
doctrines accepted by faith.  
Galor appears to have been purposefully manipulating evidence to support his 
preconceived ideas. However, an alternative explanation is that he simply did not 
know how to analyse data, but this conclusion is hard to accept because he appears 
to be familiar with mathematics and the analysis of hyperbolic distributions is 
trivially simple (Nielsen, 2014). 
Assisted by the excellent data of Maddison (2001) available to him at the time of 
the formulation of his theory, Galor was on the verge of making important 
discovery that economic growth was hyperbolic and thus that there was no 
Malthusian stagnation and no takeoffs from stagnation to growth. However he 
missed this first-rate opportunity because he failed to follow the fundamental 
principles of scientific investigation, which require that theories should be tested by 
data and that research should be guided and moderated by data.  
 Here we come to the third and probably the most plausible explanation why Galor 
appears to have been reluctant to be guided by data and why he apparently 
manipulated data to support his preconceived ideas. It is what is commonly called 
being blinded by prejudice or what psychologists describe as cascade behaviour, 
information cascade, informational avalanche, illusion of truth, illusory truth, 
illusion of familiarity, running with the pack, following the crowd, herding 
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behaviour, bandwagons and path depending choice (Anderson & Holt, 1997; Begg, 
Anas & Farinacci, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1992, 1998; De Vany 
& Lee, 2008; De Vany & Walls, 1999; Easley & Kleinberg, 2010; Grebe, Schmid 
& Stiehler, 2008; Ondrias, 1999; Parks & Tooth, 2006; Ramsey, Raafat, Chater & 
Frith, 2009; Walden & Browne, 2003).  
In the demographic and economic research this phenomenon is demonstrated by 
the reluctance to accept the compelling contradicting evidence in data simply 
because many demographers or economists would not agree with the contradicting 
evidence. It is safer to follow the crowd and run with the pack. Tradition is stronger 
than science and only an outsider who has not been blinded by prejudice and who 
is not afraid of being rejected by the crowd might dare to show that the accepted 
doctrines are incorrect. He or she is then likely to be ridiculed and rejected but 
science is a self-correcting discipline so sooner or later such resistance to accept 
the overwhelming empirical evidence will have to be broken, but it would be better 
for science and scientists if the required change in the paradigm is accepted sooner 
rather than later.  
The evidence is overwhelming: historical economic growth and historical growth 
of population were hyperbolic (Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 1993; Nielsen, 2014, 2015, 
2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f; Podlazov, 2002; Shklovskii, 1962, 
2002; von Foerster, Mora and Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975). Hyperbolic 
growth should be the basis for explaining the mechanism of the historical growth 
of population and of the historical economic growth.  
Interpretations revolving around the concept of Malthusian stagnation and around 
transitions from stagnation to growth are repeatedly and consistently contradicted 
by data and by their mathematical analyses. Historical economic growth and 
historical growth of population cannot be divided into distinctly different regimes 
governed by distinctly different mechanisms of growth. Hyperbolic growth has to 
be explained as a whole. The same mechanism has to be applied to the perceived 
slow and fast components because it is mathematically impossible to divide 
hyperbolic distributions into distinctly different sections (Nielsen, 2014). Once we 
can explain properly the mechanism of the past growth we might be able to 
understand better the current growth and how it should be controlled.   
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